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I - Introduction1
I
n this article, we examine the political survival of Portuguese Ministers us-
ing Proportional Hazards (PH) regressions. We observed all Prime-Minis-
ters and Ministers holding ministerial offices since 1976, i.e., since the
establishment of the Constitutional Governments. Therefore, we observed more
than 400 individuals. These individuals exhibit considerable heterogeneity in
terms of their days in office - from the record minimum (8 days) held by
Henrique Chaves (in 2004) to the record maximum of 5543 days held by Lino
Miguel (who achieved this in 1991).
We expect this piece of research will fill part of the gap in the literature fo-
cused on the study of the political survival rates of Portuguese Prime-Ministers
and Ministers. As it can be easily checked, there is not a comparable study to
this one in terms of the extension of the number of Portuguese2 individuals so
studied and recurring to a so enlarged set of dimensions. In any case, although
with other approaches, the work of Almeida and Pinto (2002) that analyzed the
evolution of the composition and recruitment of ministers in Portugal, since
1851 until 1999, also deserves to be quoted as methodologically close. Under-
standing better the socio-economic dimensions, the individual characteristics
and the political variables interfering in the political survival of Portuguese
Prime-Ministers and Ministers is also relevant for two additional stimuli. The
first stimulus relates to the opportunity of testing some discussed hypotheses
from the literature, namely the importance of the parliamentary majority or the
relevance of the political background/experience for enhancing the political
survival of the ministers. The second stimulus regards the opportunity of detail-
ing the present list of works about the Portuguese Constitutional Democratic
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2 We can identify the study of
Castro and Martins (2013) as a
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ours focuses on ministerial
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Regimen with a methodological discussion which will let the future research
with the possibility of observing if the differences between gender, university
degrees or party affiliation will change in face of the findings here debated.
Combining the literature with our empirical observations, we tested three
groups of variables that may be responsible for the diverse survival rates that we
identified. Because they are appointed by the Prime-Minister, we hypothesized
that ministers remain in office as long as they continue to add value to the goals
of the Prime-Minister and to the remaining governmental staff. Therefore, the
first group of variables will be composed of variables characterizing the politi-
cal environment of the government. The second group of possible determinants
relates to the socio-economic context of the minister’s tenure. Finally, the third
group of determinants is composed of the individual characteristics of each
minister (e.g., gender, age, or education).
However, we also employed two different divisions of the minister’s dura-
tion in office. First, we observed whether a minister exits his/her office during a
term; second, we observed whether he/she finishes his/her tenure but returns
years later for a new term (as in the case of the ‘political animals’ who collect
several positions as ministers of different governments).
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section II introduces
the process of nomination and exoneration of Portuguese Ministers in the Con-
stitutional Governments. In this section, the relevant literature is also reviewed.
Section III presents the empirical findings we obtained for our PH regressions,
including three different distributions for survival time (Exponential, Weibull
and Gompertz). We have also performed robustness checks, extending our anal-
ysis to different groups of ministries. Finally, section IV concludes and presents
some political implications of our results and some further challenges for this
line of research.
II - Portuguese Ministers as Political Survivors - Legislation and Literature
II.1 - Some proposals from the literature to construct the set of variables influencing the duration of Portuguese
ministers in office
Now, we construct a testable set of dimensions to explain the heterogeneous
duration of Portuguese ministers within each term. Etymologically, the word
‘minister’ comes from the Latin De Minus, associated with a person who was
under the authority of a Magis. Therefore, ministers’ duration in office depends
on the interest of the inviting Prime Minister and on the interests of the support-
ing political forces. Additionally, we also test the relevance of the evolution of
economic and political forces to the number of days served by Portuguese Min-
isters. Finally, we also include individual characteristics (such as age, educa-
tion, and the density of birthplaces), which have been shown to be relevant in
other international studies, as for example Almeida and Pinto (2002). It is ex-
pected that frameworks without pressures from the media (because scandals,
for instance), with good socioeconomic conditions and where the ministers
have more experience and education credentials promote more governmental
stability.
II.1.1 - A Minister as a trusted Principal
Portuguese Ministers are Portuguese citizens recommended by the Prime-
Minister to the President of the Portuguese Republic to perform the functions
related to ministries’ incumbency. Therefore, we can assume that there is politi-
cal trust between the Prime-Minister and the recommended and proposed Min-
isters, bearing in mind the political profile of the citizen, the nature of the
2/22 Revista de Sociologia e Política v. 28, n. 73
Ministry that will be delegated to the Minister, and the evolving socio-economic
context. However, these contexts may be disturbed by socioeconomic circum-
stances and by the pressure of the opposition parties.
Following the discussions of authors such as Bucur (2013) and Leruth and
Paul (2006), models of the problem of principal-agent behavior can be used to
observe the evolution of the political relationship between Prime-Ministers (the
“principals”) and their Ministers (the “agents”). Consequently, “hard” minis-
tries tend to be given to experienced politicians and/or to highly loyal Ministers
(in the perspective of the Prime-Ministers). The selection of ministers across the
world countries with diverse political realities was explored, for instance, by
Dowding and Dumont (2016).
In the end, for the Portuguese context, the economic conditions, be mem-
ber/or not of a party, the particularities of the ministries, the age and the educa-
tional credentials seem to be the main factors that influence the ministerial
survival.
Therefore (Bright et al., 2015), Ministries focused on Welfare issues (such
as the Ministry of Social Security or the Ministries of Work, Health or Educa-
tional Affairs) may tend to offer their incumbents a longer duration of political
office. The reasons are related to the motivations of popularity that must be
managed by the chiefs of government (Silva, 2015) combined with the impor-
tance of Welfare policies to most of the major parties of western economies
(Druckman and Warwick, 2005). As previously discussed, we follow Bright et
al. (2015), and in further research we will consider the following groups of min-
istries (Druckman and Warwick, 2005):
• Strategic Ministries: Vice-Prime-Ministry; Presidency; Finance;
Home Affairs; Parliamentary Affairs; and Foreign Affairs;
• Ministries of Social/Welfare Issues: Health; Education; Social Af-
fairs; Work/Employment; Social Security; Housing; and Social
Equipment;
• Ministries focused on specific Affairs: Environment; Culture; Sci-
ence; Public Works; Commerce and Tourism; Industry; Defense;
Justice; Economy; Youth and Sports; Transportation; Sea Affairs;
and Agriculture;
• Ministries focused on specific Policies: Quality of Life; European
integration; Administrative Reform; Equality;
• Ministries of the Republic for the Autonomous Regions of the
Azores and Madeira.
Holding different ministries is an important challenge for any politician be-
cause it leads to broadening the focus of the Minister, which can put extraordi-
nary pressure on his/her political performance (Berlinski et al., 2007). How-
ever, holding different ministries can also be interpreted as a sign of the political
trust attributed to such politicians (Almeida, 2008), which tends to increase the
political responsibility (of such ministers). As a result, following Bright et al.
(2015), holding different ministries can produce ambiguous results. On the one
hand, it may increase the survival rate of ministers who simultaneously hold dif-
ferent ministries due to the combined responsibility attributed to such intensity.
On the other hand, the minister holding different ministries may suffer an in-
creased erosion of popularity due to his or her greater exposure to an enlarged
potential criticism (Berlinski et al., 2007).
The number of days a minister serves in office essentially depends on the
added value of his/her presence to the political survival of the supporting gov-
Portuguese Ministers as Political Survivors 3/22
ernment, and it also depends on the duration of this supporting government. Al-
though the perception of added value has been discussed in the literature by
Druckman and Warwick (2005) (suggesting that this perception is a mixed re-
sult of the minister’s popularity combined with the political relevance/strength
of his/her profile and competence in managing various issues), the duration of
the government has been much more extensively analyzed in the literature.
Authors like Chiru (2015) have emphasized how being in a government sup-
ported by a parliamentary majority lengthens a minister’s duration in office. In
contrast, a government facing an effectively threatening parliamentary opposi-
tion (for instance, an opposition that has obtained the minimum number of votes
required to approve a “rejection motion”) has a higher risk of being overthrown
(Constitution of the Portuguese Republic, 1976).
Following Han (2015), we also consider the dominant political wing in the
Portuguese Parliament. Although certain works (Correa d’Almeida & Mourao,
2015) suggest the absence of significant differences in the Public Finances of
Portugal due to the different dominating political wings (Left or Right) in the
Government, other studies reveal other differences. Among these works (Rich-
ardson, 2001), we observe that it may be more likely for Right-wing (supported)
governments to minimize cabinet changes. The rationale is based on the politi-
cal tradition of assuming more cohesion in Right-Wing governments, which
minimizes cabinet changes.
II.1.2 - “It’s the Economy”
Economic conditions do influence voters’ perceptions of the incumbents’
competence as well as that of other politicians. Since Downs (1957), a vast
number of works have detailed the influence of economic issues on voters’ per-
ceptions - economic issues such as unemployment levels (Fielding, 2000), the
evolution of inflation rates (Mourao, 2013), changes in the system of social as-
sistance (Hessami, 2010), modifications to the tax structure (Akarca and An-
drianacos, 2006), and even the evolution of terms of trade and/or exchange rates
(Mayer and Raimondos-Møller, 2003). In Portugal, the works of Veiga and
Veiga (2003) can also be seen as focusing on the influence of economic condi-
tions on politicians’ popularity .
Following the literature based on Veiga and Veiga (2003), we can hypothe-
size that increases in the growth rate of the country, higher levels of real GDP
per capita, and low unemployment and/or inflation rates will increase the num-
ber of days that each minister and each government is in power. We also high-
light that, following Fielding (2000), Hardouvelis and Thomakos (2008) and
Fischer et al. (2012), voters and politicians are more sensitive to changes in
these macroeconomic indicators than to the levels of these indicators. However,
as Fischer et al. (2012) observe, even if the economic context is not the most fa-
vorable, Prime Ministers may opt to postpone cabinet reshuffling to project an
image of cohesion/unity to the public and to the political opposition.
Certain authors, such as Bright et al. (2015), have suggested that we must
consider “long term” political-economic cycles to analyze the survival of minis-
ters, incumbents and governments. Actually, Berlemann and Enkelmann (2014)
also found that the length of the period considered in the sample influences the
effect of economic variables on the politician popularity. In any case, the eco-
nomic dynamics have implications in the political contexts. However, these ef-
fects are dependent on factors as the national economy and the institutional
changes (Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier, 2013). For instance, political institutions
characterized by successive parliamentary dissolutions, political turmoil or
abrupt regime changes significantly reduce the political longevity of those as-
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suming political functions. In contrast, stable political institutions tend to pro-
vide better chances for those who have assumed political functions to maintain
their offices (Mattozzi and Merlo, 2005). In Portugal, in the political climate
since 1974, several works have identified the year 1986 (the entrance of Portu-
gal to the European Economic Community and the beginning of the first major-
ity ruled by the right-wing Prime Minister Anibal Cavaco Silva) as a structural
break in the level of political and government stability. As Mourao and Marti-
nho (2016), Veiga and Veiga (2001) and Carneiro et al. (2009) have found,
1986 is an important year in recent Portuguese economic history.
II.1.3 - The right (wo)man in the right place at the right moment
Without intending to be tautological, we note that the success of a Minister,
measured by his or her number of days in office, is also dependent on his or her
individual characteristics. Our review of the literature posits that in addition to
age (Fischer et al., 2012) and gender (Fischer et al., 2012), other influential fac-
tors relate to the social network/social capital of the minister’s primary groups
(relatives and friends), as claimed by Savage et al. (2004). Also important is his
or her level of individual probity and competence, proxied by the higher univer-
sity degrees that he/she holds (Seyd, 2015; Rose, 2014).
Some proxies useful for measuring the social capital around a politician
have been found to be the socioeconomic dimensions of his/her birthplace
and/or of his/her place of residence (as Abrantes and Roldão (2014) show, sug-
gested by the population density of these places), as well as his/her party’s affil-
iation (Almeida, 2008).
However, grounded in a longer tradition (see authors such as Bright et al.,
2015), we also identify the relevance of past political experience in enhancing a
politician’s political longevity. Therefore, we can hypothesize that individuals
who had previously been members of governments will face lower risks of be-
ing prematurely fired after assuming new functions in governments’ cabinets.
In this same line of thought, the literature on “political animals” argues that, as
in sports or in biology, competitive and ambitious individuals, who have col-
lected past (and mostly victorious) experiences, have higher probabilities of
succeeding in competitive environments, i.e., in government offices (Wissen-
burg and Schlosberg, 2014).
Table 1 exhibits the suggested dimensions proposed by the various works
that we have reviewed and their expected effects on the proportional hazard of
Portuguese Ministers finishing their tenures. Table 1 also presents the sources
of our data regarding these variables.
We start by detailing that the all data were obtained from the following
sources: CVCE (2016); FFMS (2016); INE (2016); Pordata (2016); Reto and Sá
(2016); and Sardica (2011). Following the literature, we considered the follow-
ing variables: yearly GDP real growth rate; yearly change in unemployment
rate; yearly change in inflation rate; member/or not of a political party (dum-
mies); number of past functions as a member of the government; number of
ministries simultaneously held by the same minister; population density (of
each minister’s birthplace); education level (1, Bachelor; 2, Master’s Degree; 3,
Ph.D. Degree; 4, Full Professor); gender (dummies); parliamentary majority
(dummies); % right-wing seats; age (of each minister at each observation); and
period after/before 1986 (dummies).
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II.2 Studying the political survival of Portuguese Prime-Ministers and Ministers - some descriptive comments
We are going to study only the period of Constitutional Governments in Por-
tugal in this paper. The first Constitutional Government was established in 1976
with Mario Soares as Prime Minister. This was the first government supported
by a national Parliament elected after the approval of the Constitution of 1976
on the 2nd of April. Between the Carnation revolution (25th of April, 1974) and
the first day of the First Constitutional Government (23rd of July, 1976) there
were six Provisory Governments. These Provisory Governments were directly
nominated by the President of the Republic, without observing the composition
of the National Parliament. Therefore, to avoid the insertion of sample biases,
we will concentrate our analysis on the period after 1976, in which the parlia-
mentary composition was clearly associated with the duration of the Portuguese
Governments.
After collecting official data for all the 419 Portuguese citizens who held po-
sitions related to 453 Ministerial offices and for all 13 citizens who led the 20
Constitutional Governments (until 2015), we can share some preliminary ob-
servations. Following the values shown in Table 2, we observe that the mean
value for the duration of ministerial functions is 368 days (423 for Prime-Minis-
ters, PM, and 366 for Ministers).
The year 1986 has historically constituted a natural structural break when
characterizing the recent period of Portuguese democracy (Mourao and Marti-
nho, 2016). In addition to being the year of Portugal’s entrance into the Euro-
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Table 1 - Synthesis of the variables suggested in the literature as determinants of ministers’ duration in office
Variable/Proxy Main authors Expected effect on the pro-
portional hazard of incum-
bents/ministers exiting office
Source of our data
Yearly GDP real growth rate Fielding (2000); Veiga and
Veiga (2003)
- PORDATA (2016)
Yearly Change (increase) in
unemploym. rate
Fielding (2000); Veiga and
Veiga (2003)
+ PORDATA (2016)
Yearly Change (increase) in
inflation rate
Fielding (2000); Veiga and
Veiga (2003)
+ PORDATA (2016)
Member of a political party Almeida (2008); Fischer et al.
(2012)
- SS
Number of past functions as a
member of the Government
Almeida (2008); Fischer et al.
(2012); Bright et al. (2015)
- SS
Number of ministries simulta-
neously holding by the same
minister
Bright et al. (2015); Berlinski et
al. (2007)
-/+ SS
Density (birthplace) Abrantes and Roldão (2014) - INE (2016)
Education level Fischer et al. (2012); Abrantes
and Roldão (2014)
- SS
Gender Fischer et al. (2012) +/- SS
Parliamentary Majority Chiru (2015) - PORDATA (2016)
% right-wing seats Almeida (2008); Han (2015) +/- PORDATA (2016)
Age Fischer et al. (2012) +/- SS
After 1986 Veiga and Veiga (2003); Afonso
(2013); Carneiro et al. (2009)
-
Source: elaborated by the authors. SS Several Sources (including CVCE, 2016; FFMS, 2016; Reto and Sá, 2016; Sardica,
2011).
pean Economic Community, it was also the year of the first stable parliamentary
majority of the country, which brought significant changes to the functioning of
Portugal’s political institutions (Carneiro et al., 2009).
Before 1986, the Ministers with the most days in office per term were the
Ministers of the government under Prime-Minister Mário Soares, during the pe-
riod from the 9th of June, 1983 to the 6th of November, 1985 (most of these min-
isters had tenures of 881 days). During this period (1976-1986), the record for
the minimum length of time in ministerial office is held by A. Oliveira e Silva
(Minister of Home Affairs in the 2nd Constitutional Government), 28 days.
In terms of total days in office (including more than one government), Lino
Miguel (Minister of the Republic for the Autonomous Region of the Madeira)
holds the record with 3413 days in 1985. In contrast, the already-mentioned A.
Oliveira e Silva (Home Affairs) had the lowest number of accumulated days in
office (28 days).
After 1986, the highest values per tenure (1689 days in 2009) are those of
the Ministers of the government under Prime-Minister José Sócrates during the
period from the 12th of March, 2005 to the 26th of October, 2009. Regarding ac-
cumulated days in office, Lino Miguel (Minister of the Republic for the Auton-
omous Region of the Madeira), was again the citizen with the most accumulated
days in office (a total of 5543 days). Henrique Chaves (Youth, Sports and Reha-
bilitation) had the lowest number of days (8 days in 2004).
When we consider men versus women, the mean for men tends to be higher
than for women, whether for days in term or for accumulated days in office.
Margarida Marques de Almeida (Education Minister) and Teresa Morais (Min-
ister of Culture) had the shortest tenures (27 days, from 30th of October of 2015
to 26th of November of 2015). In terms of the longest tenures, Maria de Lurdes
Rodrigues (Education) was the Portuguese woman serving the highest number
of continuous days in a ministerial term (1689 days, from 2005 until 2009) and
Manuela Ferreira Leite (Finance) was the woman with the most accumulated
days (she accumulated 2426 days in 2004).
Recalling that, in fact, we observed 13 different Prime-Ministers and 419
different Ministers for 20 governments (23/7/1976/ - 26/11/ 2015). The number
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Table 2 - Descriptive statistics on the days in tenure and on the cumulated days in ministerial office of Portuguese Ministers
(1976 -2015)
Days in tenure
N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
All sample 1509 368.4983 338.5155 8 1689
Prime-Minister 63 422.81 430.4 27 1689
Minister 1446 366.13 333.92 8 1689
Before 1986 620 261.9742 189.1566 28 881
After 1986 889 442.7897 395.2362 8 1689
Women 120 383.8417 358.5747 27 1689
Men 1374 364.3981 333.2392 8 1689
Parliamentary Minority 639 283.9624 263.1261 13 1458
Parliamentary Majority 870 430.5885 372.7069 8 1689
Left 867 320.7797 324.0084 13 1689
Right 642 432.9408 347.1559 8 1592
Source: elaborated by the authors.
of observations relate to multiple yearly observations made for each individual
(at least 3 observations: starting date in office, medium term, and exit date). The
descriptive statistics of the variables are provided in Table 3.
Briefly commenting on Table 3, we observe that the yearly growth rates of
real GDP per capita, unemployment and inflation have significant oscillations.
For the growth rate of real GDP per capita, the minimum value (-3.6%) oc-
curred in 2012 and the maximum value (+8.1%) is associated to with the year
1990. The maximum values of the changes in unemployment and inflation rates
were observed in 1993 (+33.3%) and 2011 (+160.4%), respectively. Approxi-
mately 67% of Portuguese Ministers were members of political parties and ap-
proximately 92% were men (as also Soares, 2016, identified). The maximum
number of past ministerial functions was observed, indeed, for Lino Miguel
(Minister of the Republic for the Autonomous Region of Madeira) when he ac-
cepted his positions in the 11th Constitutional Government (in 1991). Education
level is a variable taking discrete values characterizing the highest education de-
gree held by the Minister (1, Bachelor; 2, Master’s Degree; 3, Ph.D. Degree; 4,
Full Professor). The minimum percentage of right-wing seats was recorded in
the 17th Constitutional Government, 2005-2009) and the maximum percentage
of right-wing seats in the National Assembly was recorded during the 2nd major-
ity of Cavaco Silva (12th Constitutional Government, 1991-1995). The mean
age for a Portuguese Minister starting his/her tenure is 55.8 years. Finally, sev-
eral ministers simultaneously managed three different ministries (the maximum
number of simultaneously managed ministries); for instance, Jorge Coelho
achieved this record in the year 2000.
Moving to a more focused empirical analysis of the duration of Portuguese
Prime-Ministers and Ministers in the Constitutional Governments, we will will
consider the number of consecutive days in office of each individual (PM or
Minister) within each term. A proper indicator of the survival rate is provided
by the Kaplan-Meier Survival Probability estimate (Berlinski et al., 2007;
Bright et al., 2015) for the period of t days, given by
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Yearly GDP real growth rate (%) 1429 2.381 2.611 -3.638 8.095
Yearly Change in unemploym. Rate (growth rate), % 1509 5.382 25.377 -26.86 33.342
Yearly Change in inflation rate (growth rate), % 1429 -12.800 53.303 -267.86 160.45
Member of a political party 1493 0.669 0.471 0 1
Number of past functions as a member of the Government 1350 0.966 1.374 0 10
Density (birthplace) 1392 3931.89 3798.63 9.7 9550.1
Education level 1365 1.765 1.092 1 4
Gender ,dummy (Man=1) 1493 0.919 0.271 0 1
Parliamentary Majority, dummy 1509 0.576 0.494 0 1
% right-wing seats 1509 44.55 5.890 36.01 56.71
Age 1499 55.871 11.772 36 78
Year After 1986 (dummy) 1509 0.589 0.492 0 1
Number of ministries simultaneously holding 1499 1.255 0.512 1 3










where t0 refers to the starting period.
Suppose that we observed 1000 individual cases. Only 400 of them retained
their ministerial charge for a period of 250 days. Then, S250 = (1000-600)/1000
= 0.400; 150 of the “surviving” 400 individuals were dismissed before 500

















meaning that the Kaplan-Meier Survival Probability estimate for the period ti is
the product operator for the successive survival rates observed for the previous
periods. For instance, recalling our example, S500 = 0.400*(250/400) = 0.250.
Considering the different survival rates for the different periods, we present
the Kaplan-Meier estimates for the 432 individuals we studied (Figures 1-5).
Figures 1-5 consider some of the classical divisions suggested by the literature
review for analyzing the survival capacities of political leaders and politicians
in office (being PM or only a Minister, holding the office before or after 1986,
gender, and type of parliamentary majority).
Figures 1-5 exhibits the Kaplan-Meier survival estimates considering con-
secutive days in office3.
We also run the proper tests of equality across the different strata generated
by the partitions that we used for these preliminary steps (Ministers vs Prime-
Ministers, Before vs After 1986, Women vs Men, Parliamentary Minority vs
Parliamentary Majority, and Left vs Right-wing majority). A p-value close to
zero means that we cannot expect a significant similarity in survival curves be-
tween those individuals belonging to one stratum and those belonging to an-
other. For running the tests of equality across the different strata we used three
tests - log-rank, Wilcoxon-Breslow-Gehan, and Peto-Peto - and have included
the p-values below each figure.
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Source: elaborated by the authors.
Figura 1 - Political survival of individuals being Prime-Ministers (PM) or only a Minister
3 We have also studied and
produced figures for a second
group of analyses, focused on
the Kaplan-Meier survival
estimates considering
accumulated days in ministry
offices. For shortening the
length of this paper and given
the results derived from this
second group did not provide
additional and significant
insights, we opted for skipping
them. Anyway, they will be
available if requested.
The different figures do let us clearly identify higher political survival rates
for individuals holding office in governments supported by parliamentary ma-
jorities (Figure 4), especially by right-wing majorities (Figure 5).
Based on this first insight, we also observed that the political survival of in-
dividuals in ministry offices increased after 1986 (Figure 2), and this survival
rate tends to be higher for women until approximately 800 days in office (Figu-
re 3).
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Source: elaborated by the authors.
Figura 2 - Political survival of individuals holding the office before or after 1986
Source: elaborated by the authors.
Figura 3 - Survival rate tends to be higher for women until approximately 800 days in of-
fice
II.3 Motivation of the work
Therefore, starting from these motivating observations, we investigate the
determinants affecting the changes in political survival rates among ministers in
Portugal since 1976. There are three major motivations supporting this effort.
First, this study is pioneering the study of the political survival rates of Por-
tuguese Ministers and Prime Ministers. It can be quickly confirmed by review-
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Source: elaborated by the authors.
Figura 4 - Political survival rates for individuals holding office in governments supported
by parliamentary majorities
Source: elaborated by the authors.
Figura 5 - Political survival rates for individuals holding office in governments supported
by right-wing majorities
ing the literature that there have been very few attempts to study so many
individuals by focusing on their various details and trying to test determinants
of their highly heterogeneous survival rates.
Second, we will test a robust set of hypotheses that the literature on political
science and economics has suggested and tested for other western democracies
and Mediterranean countries (Fedeli et al., 2014).
Finally, we are going to observe each individual (/Minister) in two types of
duration already identified. The first type relates to his/her duration within each
form of ministerial tenure, a standard measure (Fernandes and Magalhaes,
2015). However, we realize that there are those cases which are metaphorically
called “political animals”, i.e., ministers who, after ending one tenure (without
being dismissed or due to the normal duration of their term), return to new min-
isterial functions (some years later). Therefore, the “exit” of a minister from a
ministerial tenure may not be his/her final farewell to his/her political life. Con-
sequently, the dimensions increasing the hazard of his/her exit from a ministe-
rial tenure can be different from those increasing the hazard of his/her exit from
ministerial experiences. We will also analyze these differences.
III - Estimating the hazard of a Portuguese Prime-Minister or Minister having his or her tenure in danger -
an empirical analysis based on proportional hazards regression
We now study by an appropriated and detailed way the political survival rate
of a Portuguese Minister or Prime Minister in the Constitutional Governments
(1976-2015). For this purpose, we also reviewed several works on the statistical
analysis of duration models. We particularly recommend the works of Berlinski
et al. (2007) and Bright et al. (2015), especially focused on political science.
Additionally, our review of literature focused on the political survival of indi-
viduals (Park and Hendry, 2015) and also suggested a methodological frame-
work based on proportional hazards (PH) regressions.
The group of PH regressions is composed of the Cox PH regression and the
parametric regression models (Ross, 2000; George et al., 2014). As Klein and
Moeschberger (2005) observe, the Cox regression has been used in various sci-
entific fields. This type of regression allows researchers to determine which in-
dividual characteristics (in our case, the characteristics of each Portuguese
Minister or Prime-Minister) influence the survival of the subject in some risky
situation (in this case, a Minister’s presence in office).
Equation 1 exhibits the general form of the Cox proportional hazards regres-
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Equation 1 shows that, with n ministers being studied, the hazard rate (the
probability of presence in office after t days, i.e.,) depends on the vector of the
considered variables (x), the vector of the regression coefficients, and the base-
line hazard (i.e., the probability of being in office when all of the explanatory
variables are equal to 0).
The regression coefficients can be interpreted as expressing the relationship
between the proportional change that is expected in the hazard and the changes
in the explanatory variables. Therefore, significant estimated coefficients
higher than 1 relate to determinants that increase the hazard of shortening the
political life (as minister) of a citizen; conversely, significant coefficients lower
than 1 are associated with variables diminishing that hazard, and so those vari-
ables can be identified as variables contributing to a longer political term of
each minister.
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In the class of Cox PH models, the baseline hazard does not depend on the
explanatory variables; it depends only on t. Furthermore, the exponential com-
ponent includes the explanatory variables but not the number of time periods
(i.e., in this case, the number of days). Finally, the explanatory variables are
time-independent (typically called the “proportional hazard assumption”).
However, a strong assumption must hold: the proportional hazards assump-
tion requires that the difference in log hazard associated with a change in each
covariate is not time-dependent.
To test this assumption, we ran the test on the Schoenfeld residuals on func-
tions of time. A non-zero slope indicates a violation of the proportional hazard
assumption, which prompts the suggestion of retiring the covariates that were
found to violate the assumption (Keele, 2010). The results of the tests on the
Schoenfeld residuals are exhibited in the last rows of Tables 4-5.
However, as there are many and very different individuals in the sample, un-
observed individual heterogeneity or other random effects in survival analysis
can be an issue. Therefore, we also considered the use of frailty models to ac-
count for this possibility.
Therefore, following Omariba et al. (2007), the hazard model with frailty
assumes that the risk of each individual i is dependent on the measured dimen-
sions (as in Equation 2) and on random perturbations due to the unobserved ef-
fect of a certain characteristic j:
h t x h t x
ij ij j j ij ij
( | , ) ( | )  (2)
The frailty j is a random variable taking on positive values, with the mean
normalized to one and finite variance, which is assumed to follow a gamma dis-
tribution (Oakes, 1982). As Hanagal and Pandey (2015) suggested, “The
gamma distribution is the most commonly used frailty distribution, largely be-
cause of its mathematical convenience; () Another choice is the inverse Gaussi-
an distribution. The inverse Gaussian makes the population homogeneous with
time, whereas for gamma the relative heterogeneity is constant”. If this variance
estimate is not statistically different from zero, then all the politicians have the
same risk of exiting the functions; in contrast, if this estimate is statistically dif-
ferent from zero, then there is the suggestion that unmeasured/unmeasurable
factors (Omariba et al., 2007) are interfering in the heterogeneous rate of fail-
ures observed for the cases.
We also estimated three types of parametric regression models, exploring
the unobserved individual heterogeneity. According to these three types, we as-
sumed three alternative forms of the survival distribution that are very common
in demographics, medical science, and statistics - the exponential form, the
Weibull form, and the Gompertz form (Ross, 2000; George et al., 2014). Avail-
able results will be exhibited if requested.
III.1 - Empirical findings
As mentioned above, we are studying two different types of ‘political sur-
vival’ of Prime-Ministers or Ministers. The first sense of ‘political survival’ re-
lates to the survival of each minister within his/her government’s tenure; the
second sense of ‘political survival’ relates to each minister’s survival in minis-
terial functions, considering not only the days in office within each government
but also the cumulated days as Minister or as Prime-Minister. For instance,
when Cavaco Silva ended his 3rd term as PM (which lasted 1458 days, from the
31st of October, 1991 to the 28th of October, 1995) he reached a total of 4015
days in ministerial functions: 3643 days as PM (from 6/11/1985 to 28/10/1995)
and 372 as Minister of Finance (from 3/1/1980 to 9/1/1981).

























Table 4 - Proportional Hazard of a Prime-Minister counting less days within a term
Covariates (1) Cox (2) Cox (3) Cox (4) Cox (with vv. Not vio-
lating the PH assumption)
(5) Cox (with vv. Not vio-
lating the PH assumption)
(6) Cox (with vv. Not vio-
lating the PH assumption)
Years 1976-2015 1976-1985 1986-2015 1976-2015 1976-1985 1986-2015
Yearly GDP real growth rate 0.701** 0.951 0.612*** 0.712** 0.942 0.617***
(0.250) (0.271) (0.266) (0.221) (0.0242) (0.251)
Yearly Change in unemploym.
rate
1.269 1.028 1.431*** 1.276 1.033 1.442***
(0.324) (0.289) (0.138) (0.388) (0.301) (0.142)
Yearly Change in inflation rate 1.212** 1.011 1.282*** 1.231** 1.013 1.272***
(0.030) (0.881) (0.042) (0.038) (0.882) (0.043)
Member of a political party 0.981 0.921** omitted 0.951 0.933** omitted
(0.172) (0.021) (0.183) (0.022)
Number of past functions as a
member of the Gov’n’mt
0.923** 0.991 0.911** 0.928** 0.994 0.918**
(0.031) (0.231) (0.062) (0.029) (0.332) (0.063)
Density (birthplace) 0.918** 0.913*** 0.911*** 0.903** 0.915*** 0.912***
(0.039) (0.003) (0.002) (0.040) (0.003) (0.002)
Education level 1.031 1.012 1.054 1.039 1.014 1.077
(0.711) (0.834) (0.827) (0.699) (0.844) (0.831)
Gender 0.001 1.231*** omitted
(0.771) (0.019)
Parliamentary Majority 0.945 0.891** 0.659*** 0.932 0.892** 0.668***
(0.034) (0.051) (0.041) (0.038) (0.049) (0.048)
% right-wing seats 1.040* 1.033 1.035 1.039* 1.032 1.035
(0.034) (0.088) (0.045) (0.033) (0.091) (0.041)
Age 1.003 1.022 1.032
(0.032) (0.035) (0.032)
After 1986 0.042*** 0.055***
(0.021) (0.025)
Number of Prime-Ministers 20 9 11 20 9 11
Dummies Prime-Ministers yes yes Yes Yes Yes yes
Log-likelihood -2.211 0.612 0.434 -2.261 0.713 0.652
AIC 1.315 3.213 7.131 1.372 3.329 6.128
Overall Schoenfeld p-value 0.116 0.762 0.805 0.226 0.812 0.856
Source: elaborated by the authors.
Note: “ Omitted” means that the associated variable was omitted in the regression. In the case, the omission of the variable identifying members of a party means that all the PM after 1986 were




















Table 5 - Proportional Hazard of a Minister counting less days within a term
Covariates (1) Cox (2) Cox (3) Cox (4) Cox (with vv. Not violating
the PH assumption)
(5) Cox (with vv. Not violating
the PH assumption)
(6) Cox (with vv. Not violating
the PH assumption)
Years 1976-2015 1976-1985 1986-2015 1976-2015 1976-1985 1986-2015
Yearly GDP real growth rate 0.980 0.913 0.937 0.991 0.916 0.937
(0.512) (0.095) (0.039) (0.510) (0.091) (0.038)
Yearly Change in unemploym.
rate
0.999 0.994 10.004 0.992 0.990 1.005
(0.001) (0.031) (0.007) (0.001) (0.032) (0.007)
Yearly Change in inflation rate 1.004*** 0.996 1.006*** 1.003*** 0.994 1.006***
(0.0007) (0.003) (0.008) (0.0006) (0.004) (0.007)
Member of a political party 1.003 0.907 1.153 1.002 0.901 1.152
(0.102) (0.136) (0.181) (0.104) (0.199) (0.180)
Number of past functions as a
member of the Gov’n’mt
0.971 0.952 0.963 0.972 0.959 0.961
(0.069) (0.078) (0.071) (0.071) (0.079) (0.070)
Density (birthplace) 1.011 1.041 0.969 1.012 1.040 0.962
(0.023) (0.036) (0.029) (0.022) (0.037) (0.030)
Education level 0.884** 0.932* 0.891** 0.897** 0.934* 0.892**
(0.049) (0.021) (0.051) (0.052) (0.020) (0.050)
Number of ministries
simultaneously holding
1.298 0.939 1.537*** 1.219** 0.941 1.568***
(0.269) (0.107) (0.219) (0.105) (0.111) (0.222)
Gender 0.959 1.002 0.917
(0.201) (0.734) (0.164)
Parliamentary Majority 0.281*** 0.273*** 0.502*** 0.459*** 0.281*** 0.664***
(0.044) (0.121) (0.097) (0.047) (0.131) (0.099)
% right-wing seats 0.950*** 0.913*** 0.932** 0.931*** 0.924*** 0.928***
(0.011) (0.028) (0.012) (0.012) (0.014) (0.022)
Age 1.038 1.041 1.040
(0.046) (0.049) (0.039)
After 1986 0.194*** 0.287***
(0.029) (0.030)
Number of Ministers 473 197 276 473 197 276
Dummies Ministers yes Yes Yes Yes Yes yes
Log-likelihood -2137.14 -775.13 -1041.62 -2246.12 -781.12 -1044.26
AIC 4292.3 1566.27 2101.38 4301.45 1592.81 2535.25
Overall Schoenfeld (p-value) 0.564 0.229 0.387 0.589 0.301 0.463
Source: elaborated by the authors.
Note: The interception was estimated but not exhibited here. The robust standard errors are between the parentheses. Significance levels: 1%, ***; 5%, **; 10%, *.
The following Tables (Tables 4-5) report the results of two specifications of
the Cox proportional hazard analysis of our data (with all the covariates previ-
ously introduced, columns 1 to 3), or without the covariates violating the pro-
portional hazard assumption -(columns 4 to 6), as well as the results of the
estimations resulting from dividing the observations for the sub-samples com-
posed of the observations prior to 1986 or after 1986 (as clearly suggested by
the results from the tests of the equality of the survivor functions and by the sta-
tistical significance of the estimated coefficient for the dummy signaling the pe-
riod after 1986). Table 4 presents the estimates of the Cox survival functions
related to the PM; Table 5 presents the estimates of the Cox survival functions
related to Portuguese Ministers.
Table 4 shows the estimates of our Equation 1, related to the days in office of
Portuguese Prime-Ministers. In column 1, we observe that higher growth rates
of GDP contribute to an increased number of days in office of Portuguese
Prime-Ministers. The estimated coefficient means that there are approximately
30% fewer individuals exiting the function of Prime-Minister when the real
growth rates of GDP are one percentage point higher. We also found the esti-
mated coefficients for the number of past functions as a member of other gov-
ernments and for the density of the birthplace. These findings suggest that PM
with greater political experience in previous governments exhibit higher proba-
bilities of survival in Portugal. The chosen proxy for the natural social capital
(proxied by the density of the birthplace) has also been found to be statistically
significant, suggesting that PM coming from more dense places tend to survive
better in office. As expected, years characterized by more significant changes in
the unemployment rate (especially after 1986 - column 3 of Table 4) or in the in-
flation rate tend to put the PM in a riskier situation.
If we split the sample, using the year 1986 as a breaking point, we clearly ob-
serve the importance of the variable related to the presence of a supporting par-
liamentary majority as a factor for increasing the duration of the number of days
that a PM is in office (column 3 of Table 4). This follows a well-established re-
sult in the economic and political science literature (Chiru, 2015). Being a mem-
ber of a political party significantly extended the days in office of Portuguese
Prime-Ministers before 19864.
Columns 4, 5 and 6 reveal that the estimates of the Cox proportional hazards
of a Prime Minister show fewer days in office within each term, but now we
omit the variables that we found violating the assumption of the proportional
hazard (meaning that these variables are not time-independent). We found that
gender is a variable violating the proportional hazard assumption (p-value is
0.012). However, after omitting this variable, as suggested by Fischer et al.,
2012 (for presidential systems), we did not find relevant changes in the esti-
mates of the Cox survival functions for the Portuguese PM.
Table 5 shows the estimates related to the Cox Proportional Hazard model
but now considers each individual’s duration in ministerial offices.
In column 1 of Table 5, we can observe that abrupt changes in the inflation
rate tend to shorten the tenure of a minister. Additionally, we also observed that
right-wing majorities in the Parliament tend to increase the number of days in
office of Portuguese ministers.
From a contrasting perspective, and still observing column 1 of Table 5,
there are dimensions contributing to a significant extension of days in office.
First, in the period after 1986 there are more ministers serving more days in each
term than in the period before 1986. The estimated coefficient (0.194) is highly
significant and its magnitude is impressive: its value means that the number of
ministers leaving office after 1986 with a given tenure’s length is 5 times less
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4 Actually, the governments
of non-members of political
parties (the 3rd, led by Nobre
da Costa, from 29/08/1978 to
22/11/1978; and the 5th, led by
Lourdes Pintasilgo, from
7/7/1979 to 3/1/1980) are clear
examples of this short
duration.
the number of ministers leaving office before 1986 with the same length. This
follows Abrantes and Roldão (2014). In the period before 1986 - a period domi-
nated by intense parliamentary turmoil and by the youth of the Portuguese dem-
ocratic institutions - there were 15 governments (6 Provisory governments and
9 Constitutional governments). After 1986, with Portugal having been accepted
as a member of the European Community and after the first experiences of par-
liamentary majorities based in just one party, governments’ durations signifi-
cantly increased, which contributed to longer ministerial terms.
Another dimension significantly increasing the probability of a former min-
ister serving more days in office relates to his/her education. Ministers charac-
terized by a higher level of education (e.g., holding a Ph.D. or being Full
Professors) have tended to have longer tenures, following Fischer et al. (2012).
As also found highly significant was the coefficient estimated for the
dummy signaling the periods after and before 1986, we considered it important
to split the sample by checking this partition. Therefore, column 2 exhibits the
results of the Cox PH Model for the years before 1986, and column 3 exhibits
the results for the years after 1986.
After conducting tests of the validity of the proportional hazard assumption
for all the covariates previously analyzed in Table 5, it was found that the
dummy variable related to gender violates the proportional hazard assumption
(p-value lower than 5%). Therefore, following authors such as Park and Hendry
(2015), we have to re-estimate the Cox PH model without the violating vari-
ables (in this case, without gender). Columns 4, 5 and 6 of Table 5 show the ob-
tained results. These results are not significantly different than the results
exhibited in columns 1, 2 and 3 of Table 5. We also observe that age influences
the duration of Portuguese ministers in office: older ministers tend to serve
shorter times in office.
When working with survival models, it is also advisable to run additional re-
gressions and to relax the proportional hazard assumption of the Cox survival
models (Park and Hendry, 2015). Therefore, we also assumed different distri-
butions of the survival time using established parametric forms. We generated
tables (available if requested) exhibiting the estimates of the survival of Portu-
guese PM and of Portuguese Ministers within each tenure and in the political
life of ministerial functions, assuming three different distributions of the sur-
vival time - an exponential distribution (based on a constant hazard rate across
time), a Weibull distribution (given that the log of the hazard is a linear function
of the log of time), and a Gompertz(-Makeham), assuming that the log of the
hazard is a linear function of the time. More details about the differences in
these distributions are provided by Ross (2000) or George et al. (2014). As pre-
viously suggested, we are going to explore the possibility of unobserved indi-
vidual heterogeneity and its relevance for the different distributions. Following
Hanagal and Pandey (2015), we are going to assume a gamma distribution for
the variance of the frailty variable5.
Generally, the results from these Tables follow those of Table 4 to Table 5.
Having a supporting parliamentary majority (composed of right-wing forces) in
the period after 1986 clearly increases the survival of Portuguese PM and Min-
isters. Age has an estimated significant effect in the opposite direction of the
level of education in terms of cumulated length in ministerial offices -, we found
that getting older diminishes the survival hazard in ministerial functions and
that having more education contributes to a longer political life in Portugal.
The estimated values of  (variance parameter associated with the frailty ef-
fect in the models) are not statistically significant considering the exponential
form or the Weibull form of the survival distribution. However, the estimated
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5 We have also observed the
differences when using an
inverted gaussian distribution
for the variance of the frailty.
However, there are no
statistically significant
differences. Additional
evidences are available under
request.
values for  (considering a Gompertz form of the survival distribution) vary be-
tween 1.234 and 1.834 (considering a Gamma distribution of the frailty) in
these Tables (available if requested). These values are statistically significant,
revealing that unobserved characteristics of the cases also explain the heteroge-
neity of survival/failures of Portuguese ministers. This converges with studies
in literature like Fischer et al. (2012) or Fedeli et al. (2014).
III.2 Robustness checks - do different ministries ensure higher political survival rates?
After studying the dimensions influencing the political survival of Portu-
guese Ministers and Prime Ministers, and after considering the differences in
the periods in which each individual was in office, the differences in each tenure
and in the accumulated number of days in ministerial functions of each minister,
and the different distributions of survival time, we now explore the robustness
of these results in additional directions. We constructed additional Tables
(available if requested) which provide the results obtained after including the
dummies identifying each group of ministries in the PH models.
By including the dummies identifying the groups of Portuguese Ministries
already discussed, we have not found any relevant changes in the estimated co-
efficients if we compare them with the coefficients in Tables 4-5, namely the
absence of statistical significance of the estimated coefficients for the dummies
in the estimations of the PH models for survival within legislative tenures.
Therefore, we cannot ensure that in considering the duration within each tenure,
a certain group of ministries will provide longer terms.
However, there is evidence that the Ministries for the Autonomous Regions
of the Azores and Madeira contributed to a higher number of cumulated days in
office (columns 4, 5 and 6); from a contrasting perspective, holding office in
Ministries focused on specific policies (like the Ministry for Administrative Re-
form or the Ministry for European Integration) seems to be more lethal in terms
of pursuing future ministerial functions. Once again, the statistical significance
of  suggests that the unobserved individual heterogeneity may play an impor-
tant role for explaining the different survival rates if we consider a Gompertz
form for the survival distribution.
IV - Conclusions, Political Implications and Further Research
This work has focused on the political survival of Portuguese Ministers and
Prime Ministers. Using Cox Proportional Hazard Models and different specifi-
cations of the distribution of survival time (an exponential, a Weibull, and a
Gompertz-Makeham distribution), we achieved relevant results for explaining
the heterogeneous survival rates of the more than 400 Ministers who have held
offices since 1976 (i.e., since the 1st Constitutional Government).
We used the conventional measure, and for each minister we counted the
number of consecutive days in term.
Our results highlight the relevance of parliamentary majorities in the period
after 1986, the importance of belonging to a political party, and the importance
of higher education for ministers expecting longer tenures. Even if we consider
the cumulated number of days in ministerial office (whose results and tables are
available if requested), these dimensions are still found to be statistically signif-
icant. However, having had past ministerial experiences is an important vari-
able for increasing the accumulated duration in office, meaning that “political
animals” tend to have greater chances of being invited (and often invited again)
to fulfill ministerial functions. We also observed that being a minister of the Re-
public for the Autonomous regions (of the Azores or Madeira) tended to ensure
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a longer political life; conversely, being in charge of a Ministry focused on spe-
cific policies (e.g., for Administrative Reform or for Equality) has been shown
to not ensure many days in office.
This work suggests three major implications. The first relates to the chal-
lenge of stability and of political maturity that was observed in Portugal after
1986. On the one hand, this political stability significantly increased the dura-
tion of ministerial terms. However, it also contributed to the appearance of sev-
eral individuals who accumulated days in office in different governments,
which can be discussed as a relevant challenge to the renewal of political
groups. Second, ‘independent’ ministers (i.e., not affiliated with any party) may
expect a shorter duration in office. If, according to one perspective, being a
member of a party is usually seen as a mark of the enlarged social capital of the
minister, from another perspective, our results suggest that ‘independent’ min-
isters exhibit a higher frailty of exiting sooner. Finally, the role of parliamentary
majorities seems very influential for explaining the different durations of Portu-
guese Ministers. This implies that the same pattern of action by a minister may
be less scrutinized in parliamentary majorities than in parliamentary minorities,
which raises several concerns about the effectiveness of the Parliamentary insti-
tutions.
The insights here highlighted are interesting contributions for improving
our understanding about the addressed topics, namely for the Portuguese
context and specifically for the period considered. This work is in line with
the results found, for instance, by Soyland (2017) for the Norwegian context
and by Moury and Standring (2017) for the Portuguese framework. In these
fields it is always important to be aware about the world changes and dynam-
ics, namely those from the British reality, including for the political parties
(Quinn, 2019).
We propose four major challenges for extending the present study. The first
challenge regards the role of individual/fiscal scandals in the abrupt end of min-
isterial functions in some cases in Portugal, considering, also, works about these
topics from other realities, as the British (Berlinski et al., 2012), Latin American
democracies (Camerlo and Pérez-Liñán, 2015) and when the chief of the execu-
tive is a prime minister or a president (Dewan and Myatt, 2007). Detailing the
nature of these scandals, we will be able to observe which scandals are more le-
thal for the political survival of some ministers and which scandals are more in-
significant. The second challenge regards the possibility of including some
`prestige indicators’ that some media units have already produced for some pe-
riods in Portugal and focusing on the performance of ministers and of other po-
litical agents. The third challenge suggests that we explore the interactions
between some of our variables (e.g., gender and education or gender and strate-
gic ministerial office) to refine the findings presented in this discussion, consid-
ering studies as, for example, that developed by Escobar-Lemmon and
Taylor-Robinson (2016). Finally, the fourth challenge relates to the possibility
of enhancing the analysis of the duration dependence issue. Given the statistical
significance of the Weibull parameter in the results we achieved, there are addi-
tional stimuli to discuss how likely ministers are to leave the office as a certain
time in office is reached, following, as instance, the work of Castro and Martins,
2013). Following this opportunity, we will also be able to properly discuss the
form of the tenures (a log form, a polynomial of tenure, or the use of dummy
variables).
Paulo Mourão (paulom@eeg.uminho.pt) is PhD in Economics by University of Minho.
Vítor Domingues Martinho (vdmartinho@esav.ipv.pt) is Professor at Polytechnic Institute of Viseu.
Portuguese Ministers as Political Survivors 19/22
References
Abrantes, P. & Roldão, C., 2014. Faces and metamorphoses of power: a sociography of the Portuguese ministers of education in
the democratic era. Educação e Pesquisa, 40(4), pp.1045-1060. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1590/s1517-97022014041384
Afonso, A., 2013. Anatomy of a Fiscal Débacle: The Case of Portugal. ISEG Economics Working Paper No.
01/2013/DE/UECE. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/ABSTRACT =2194556. Accessed at: 22.07.2020. DOI:
10.2139/ssrn.2194556
Akarca, A. T., & Andrianacos, D., 2006. Taxes, Transfers, and Voter Behavior in U.S. Midterm Elections. International Ad-
vances in Economic Research, 12(4), 468-474. DOI: 10.1007/s11294-006-9041-3
Almeida, M.A.P., 2008. Party politics in Portugal - Municipalities and central government. European Societies, 10(3), pp.
357-378. DOI: 10.1080/14616690701771813
Almeida, P.T. & Pinto, A.C., 2002. Portuguese Ministers, 1851-1999: Social Background and Paths to Power. South European
Society and Politics, 7(2) pp. 5-40. DOI: 10.1080/13608740708539625
Berlemann, M. & Enkelmann, S., 2014. The economic determinants of U.S. presidential approval: A survey. European Journal
of Political Economy, 36(s/n), pp. 41-54. DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2014.06.005
Berlinski, S., Dewan, T., & Dowding, K., 2012. Accounting for Ministers: Scandal and Survival in British Government
1945-2007. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1st Edition edition, 208 pp. DOI: 10.1017/cbo9780511980046
Berlinski, S., Dewan, T., & Dowding, K., 2007. The length of ministerial tenure in the United Kingdom, 1945-97. British Jour-
nal of Political Science, 37(2), pp. 245-262. DOI: 10.1017/s0007123407000415
Bright, J., Döring, H., & Little, C., 2015. Ministerial Importance and Survival in Government: Tough at the Top? West Euro-
pean Politics, 38(3), pp. 441-464. DOI: 10.1080/01402382.2014.993166
Bucur, C., 2013. Who fires ministers? A principal-agent approach to ministerial deselection. PhD Dissertation, Dublin, Dublin
City University. Available through https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/147606273.pdf. Accessed at: 22.07.2020.
Camerlo, M. & Pérez-Liñán, A., 2015. Minister Turnover, Critical Events, and the Electoral Calendar in Presidential Democra-
cies. The Journal of Politics, 77(3), pp. 608-619. DOI: 10.1086/681028
Carneiro, A., Guimaraes, P., & Portugal, P., 2009. Real Wages and the Business Cycle: Accounting for Worker and Firm Heter-
ogeneity. CEF.UP Working Papers 0903, Universidade do Porto, Faculdade de Economia do Porto. Available through
https://ideas.repec.org/p/iza/izadps/dp4174.html. Accessed at: 22.07.2020.
Castro, V. & Martins, R., 2013. Is there duration dependence in Portuguese local governments’ tenure? European Journal of
Political Economy, 31(1), pp. 26-39. DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2013.03.004
Chiru, M., 2015. Early Marriages Last Longer: Pre-electoral Coalitions and Government Survival in Europe. Government and
Opposition, 50(2), pp. 165-188. DOI: 10.1017/gov.2014.8
Correa d’Almeida, A. & Mourao, P., 2015. The Irrelevance of Political Parties’ Differences for Public Finances - Evidence
from Public Deficit and Debt in Portugal (1974 - 2012). European Review, 25(4) pp.560-587. DOI:
10.1017/s1062798717000291
Dewan, T. & Myatt, D.R., 2007. Scandal, protection, and recovery in the cabinet. American Political Science Review, 101(1),
pp. 63-77. DOI: 10.1017/s0003055407070025
Downs, A., 1957. An Economic Theory of Democracy. New York, Harper and Row.
Dowding, K. & Dumont, P., 2016. The Selection of Ministers around the World. Routledge, 1 edition, 318 p. DOI:
10.4324/9781315757865
Druckman, J.N. & Warwick, P.V., 2005. The missing piece: Measuring portfolio salience in Western European parliamentary
democracies. European Journal of Political Research, 44(1) pp. 17-42. DOI: 10.1111/j.1475-6765.2005.00217.x
Escobar-Lemmon, M.C. & Taylor-Robinson, M.M., 2016. Will Women in Presidential Cabinets be Power Players or Abun-
dant Tokens? Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1st edition, 320 p. DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190491420.001.0001
Fedeli, S., Forte, F., & Leonida, L., 2014. The law of survival of the political class: an analysis of the Italian parliament
(1946-2013). European Journal of Political Economy, 35(s/n), pp. 102-121. DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2014.05.001
Fernandes, J. M. & Magalhaes, P., 2015. Government survival in semi-presidential regimes. European Journal of Political Re-
search, 55(1) pp. 61-80 DOI: 10.1111/1475-6765.12116
Fielding, D., 2000. Social and economic determinants of English voter choice in the 1997 general election. Public Choice,
102(s/n), pp. 271-295.
Fischer, J., Dowding, K., & Dumont, P., 2012. The duration and durability of cabinet ministers. International Political Science
Review, 33(5), pp. 505-519. DOI: 10.1177/0192512112462971
George, B., Seals, S., & Aban, I., 2014. Survival analysis and regression models. Journal of Nuclear Cardiology, 21(4), pp.
686-694. DOI: 10.1007/s12350-014-9908-2
Han, K.J., 2015. When Will Left-Wing Governments Introduce Liberal Migration Policies? An Implication of Power Re-
sources Theory. International Studies Quarterly, 59(3), pp. 602-614. DOI: 10.1111/isqu.12156
Hanagal, D. & Pandey, A., 2015. Inverse Gaussian Shared Frailty Models with Generalized Exponential and Generalized In-
verted Exponential as Baseline Distributions. Journal of Data Science 13(3), pp.569-602.
Hardouvelis, G. & Thomakos, D., 2008. Consumer Confidence and Elections. Discussion Paper 6701, CEPR. Available
through https://ideas.repec.org/p/cpr/ceprdp/6701.html. Accessed at: 22.07.2020.
Hessami, Z., 2010. The Size and Composition of Government Spending in Europe and Its Impact on Well-Being. Kyklos, 63(3),
pp. 346-382. DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-6435.2010.00478.x
20/22 Revista de Sociologia e Política v. 28, n. 73
Keele, L., 2010. Proportionally Difficult: Testing for Nonproportional Hazards in Cox Models. Political Analysis, 18(2), pp.
189-205. DOI: 10.1093/pan/mpp044
Klein, J. P., & Moeschberger, M. L., 2005. Survival Analysis: Techniques for Censored and Truncated Data. New York:
Springer Verlag.
Leruth, L. & Paul, E., 2006. A Principal-Agent Theory Approach to Public Expenditure Management Systems in Developing
Countries. IMF Working Paper, WP/06/204, International Monetary Fund. Available through https://www.imf.org/exter-
nal/pubs/ft/wp/2006/wp06204.pdf. Accessed at: 22.07.2020.
Lewis-Beck, M.S. & Stegmaier, M., 2013. The VP-function revisited: a survey of the literature on vote and popularity functions
after over 40 years. Public Choice, 157(3-4), pp. 367-385. DOI: 10.1007/s11127-013-0086-6
Mattozzi, A. & Merlo, A., 2005. Political Careers or Career Politicians? PIER Working Paper 05-032, Penn Institute for Eco-
nomic Research. Available through https://econpapers.repec.org/paper/penpapers/05-032.htm. Accessed at: 22.07.2020.
Mayer, W. & Raimondos-Møller, P., 2003. The Politics of Foreign Aid: A Median Voter Perspective. Review of Development
Economics, 7(2), pp. 165-178. DOI: 10.1111/1467-9361.00183
Mourao, P & Martinho, V., 2016. Discussing structural breaks in the Portuguese regulation on forest fires - An economic ap-
proach. Land Use Policy, 54(s/n), pp. 460-478. DOI: 10.1016/j.landusepol.2016.03.003
Mourao, P., 2013. The Messenger of Inflation - How Media Change Political Competition. Applied Economics Letters, 20(3),
pp. 267-271. DOI: 10.1080/13504851.2012.690843
Moury, C. & Standring, A., 2017. Going beyond the Troika’: Power and discourse in Portuguese austerity politics. European
Journal of Political Research, 56(3), pp. 660-679. DOI: 10.1111/1475-6765.12190
Oakes, D., 1982. A model for association in bivariate survival data. Journal of Royal Statistical Society: Series B (Methodologi-
cal), 44(3), pp. 414-422. DOI: 10.1111/j.2517-6161.1982.tb01222.x
Omariba, D., Beaujot, R. & Rajulton, F., 2007. Determinants of infant and child mortality in Kenya: an analysis controlling for
frailty effects. Population Research and Policy Review, 26(3), pp.299-321. DOI: 10.1007/s11113-007-9031-z
Park, S. & Hendry, D., 2015. Reassessing Schoenfeld Residual Tests of Proportional Hazards in Political Science Event History
Analyses. American Journal of Political Science, 59(4), pp. 1072-1087. DOI: 10.1111/ajps.12176
Quinn, T., 2019. The Conservative Party’s leadership election of 2016: choosing a leader in government. British Politics, 14(1),
pp. 63-85. DOI: 10.1057/s41293-018-0071-2
Reto, L. & Sá, J., 2016. Esquerda e Direita em Portugal, Consensos, Divergências e Antagonismos. Lisboa: Livros Horizonte.
Richardson, B., 2001. Japan’s ‘1955 System’ and Beyond. In L. Diamond & R. Gunther, (eds.) Political parties and democ-
racy. John Hopkins University Press.
Rose, J., 2014. The Public Understanding of Political Integrity: The Case for Probity Perceptions. London: Palgrave
Macmillan.
Ross, S.M., 2000. Introduction to Probability Models, Seventh Edition. Academic Press.
Sardica, J.M., 2011. O Século XX Português. Lisboa: Texto Editores.
Savage, M., Tampubolon, G. & Warde, A., 2004. Social Capital and Political Activism: A Social Network Approach. In J.
Franklin, (ed.). Politics, Trust and Networks: Social Capital in Critical Perspective. London: London South Bank Univer-
sity.
Seyd, B., 2015. Book Review: General Politics: The Public Understanding of Political Integrity: The Case for Probity Percep-
tions. Political Studies Review 13 (2) pp. 289-289. DOI: 10.1111/1478-9302.12087_83
Soyland, M.G., 2017. Survival of the Ministers: On Ministerial Durability in Postwar Norway. Scandinavian Political Studies,
40(2), pp.182-206. DOI: 10.1111/1467-9477.12086
Veiga, F.J. & Veiga, L.G., 2001. The determinants of vote intentions in Portugal. NIPE WP 6/2001. NIPE, University of Minho.
Available through https://repositorium.sdum.uminho.pt/bitstream/1822/1455/1/Public_Choice_March_2004.pdf. Ac-
cessed at: 22.07.2020.
Veiga, F.J. & Veiga, L.G., 2003. Economia, popularidade e intenções de voto em Portugal: uma análise longitudinal com dados
agregados. NIPE Working Paper series, 5/2003, Universidade do Minho - Núcleo de Investigação em Políticas
Económicas, Portugal. Available through http://repositorium.sdum.uminho.pt/handle/1822/1364. Accessed at:
22.07.2020.
Wissenburg, M. & Schlosberg, D. 2014. Political Animals and Animal Politics. London: Palgrave-Macmillan.
Other sources
Constitution of the Portuguese Republic (1976). Available through https://dre.pt/constitution-of-the-portuguese-republic.
Accessed at: 23.07.2020.
CVCE (2016). Biografias de personalidades portuguesas. CVCE, Luxembourg.
FFMS (2016). Cronologias. Fundação Francisco Manuel dos Santos/FFMS, Lisboa. Available through
http://cronologias.ffms.pt/eventos?event=36405. Accessed at: 24.06.2019.
INE (2016). Several statistics. Available through https://www.ine.pt/xportal/xmain?xpid=INE&xpgid=ine_base_dados. Ac-
cessed at: 23.07.2020.
PORDATA (2016). Several statistics. Available through http://www.pordata.pt/. Accessed at: 23.07.2020.
Portuguese Ministers as Political Survivors 21/22
Newspaper articles
Silva, M., 2015. “Quem foi ministro mais tempo? E quais os Governos que duraram menos?”. Paço de Arcos. Expresso October
31, 2015. Available through
http://expresso.sapo.pt/politica/2015-10-30-Quem-foi-ministro-mais-tempo--E-quais-os-Governos-que-duraram-menos-- .
Accessed at: 22.07.2020.
Soares, M. (2016). “Quatro décadas de democracia: 31 mulheres ministras e 467 homens”. Paço de Arcos. Expresso. Available
through http://multimedia.expresso.pt/240415_mulheres_no_poder/. Accessed at: 22.07.2020.
Ministros Portugueses como sobreviventes políticos: uma análise empírica dos primeiros 20 governos
constitucionais
RESUMO Introdução: Avaliamos o risco proporcional de primeiros-ministros e ministros portugueses deixarem o cargo. Materiais e
Métodos: Utilizamos dias consecutivos como ministro para cada um dos 432 cidadãos que exerceram a função ministerial desde
1976. Resultados: Explorando várias divisões desse universo, concluímos que indivíduos apoiados por maiorias parlamentares, que
serviram depois de 1986, que possuíam qualificações académicas mais altas e que eram membros de partidos políticos apresentaram
menores riscos de serem exonerados do cargo. Por outro lado, ser uma pessoa com mais idade, servindo em condições econômicas
adversas, assumindo vários ministérios simultaneamente e sendo encarregado de ministérios específicos, não garantiu períodos
políticos mais longos para os ministros portugueses. Discussão: Além de ser a primeira avaliação empírica de todos os ministros
portugueses após 1974, este trabalho mostra como as habilitações mais altas são ativos importantes para os mandatos dos ministros e
como as crises econômicas são altamente estimulantes para as mudanças dos gabinetes em Portugal, o que corresponde ao padrão
observado na maioria dos regimes democráticos recentes.
PALAVRAS-CHAVE: gabinetes ministeriais; governos constitucionais portugueses; sobrevivência política; risco proporcional;
gênero.
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